The Court of Appeal refused permission to a group of pacifist taxpayers to test in the English courts the validity of the government using general taxes for military purposes, which they claimed to be in breach of their human rights, since the proper forum for such a claim was before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

Facts

The seven applicants formed a group of tax-paying pacifists (‘The Peace Tax Seven’) from a variety of religious and philosophical backgrounds. They objected to the tax, which was collected from them by central government, being paid into a single fund and then used partly for military purposes. They wished to test, by reference to art. 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) the lawfulness of the continuing failure, or the refusal on 27 January 2005, of HM Treasury to establish a special fund or account, alongside the general fund or account referred to in the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866, s. 11 and the Public Accounts and Charges Act 1891, s. 1(2), for (a) receipt of moneys on account of the Exchequer and the Inland Revenue collected or received from those who have an objection of conscience to their tax moneys being used for military purposes and (b) use for non-military purposes only.

Collins J refused permission to apply for judicial review on the ground that the claim had no arguable possibility of success. The taxpayers appealed. They argued that the interference with their art. 9 rights fell to be justified by the Treasury, which refused to set up a separate fund, denied that art. 9 was engaged and disputed that it was required to justify its refusal to act on the suggestion of a special fund or account.

Issue

Whether the impact of the decisions of the Strasbourg authorities on art. 9 in the context of general taxation was such that the application for judicial review had no reasonable prospect of success.

Decision

Mummery LJ (Scott Baker LJ and Sir Charles Mantell agreeing) (refusing permission to appeal) said that the applicants conscientiously objected to war in general. They also objected to funding it by payment of their taxes as morally equivalent to waging war. They did not, however, seek any exemptions from paying tax or any reductions in their tax bills. On the contrary, they wished to pay their tax liabilities in full, but they could not do so consistently with their consciences as long as no separate fund existed into which they could place a portion of their tax, where it could not be used to pay for war or weapons. They objected to paying into a single fund partly destined for military purposes and said that a separate fund, such as a Peace Tax Fund, would resolve their dilemma and that it was for the Treasury to justify its refusal to do what it reasonably could to assist the applicants in that dilemma.

In defence of its position the Treasury relied, as did Collins J, on the decisions of the Strasbourg authorities, in particular the decision of the European Commission of Human Rights in C v UK (1983) 37 DR 142 (Application No. 10358/83) dismissing as inadmissible an application based on similar arguments. The wording of that decision was almost identical to that of the Commission's decision in X (Ross) v UK (1982) 6 EHRR 558 (Application No. 10295/82).

In C v UK, it was stated that the obligation to pay taxes was a general one which had no specific conscientious implications in itself. Its neutrality in that sense was also illustrated by the fact that no taxpayer could influence or determine the purpose for which his or her contributions were applied, once they werecollected. Furthermore, the power of taxation was expressly recognised by the Convention system and was ascribed to the state.

Collins J held that the reasoning in that case reaching a decision on the scope of the terms of an international Convention, which would affect a number of different states, should be followed. The ruling was that the payment of taxes did not engage a person's rights under art. 9(1). If the matter was to be reconsidered, it had to be by Strasbourg. The appeal court agreed.

The Strasbourg jurisprudence was sufficiently coherent and consistent in its treatment of art. 9 applications in the context of general taxation to deter the English courts from departing from them or modifying them. In the face of the Strasbourg jurisprudence Collins J was right to refuse permission for judicial review. The Court of Appeal should do likewise without requiring the Treasury to justify its failure or refusal to act on the suggestion of a special fund or account and without expressing any view one way or the other on the arguments advanced by the Treasury on interference and justification, which were only made in order to comply with the procedural order made in connection with the renewed application.

An application for judicial review was bound to fail, unless and until the Strasbourg authorities decided to depart from or modify their earlier rulings. They had taken what might be thought to be a rather strict or narrow line on the manifestation of religious and philosophical belief in a number of areas central to the daily life of the individual citizen in the modern state, such as employment, education and fiscal responsibilities. In some respects the reasoning might be legally and logically unsound. What mattered for present purposes, however, was that it was a clear and consistent line and, as such, had to be respected by the courts of the UK.

The proper forum in which the applicants should make their attack on the decisions of the Strasbourg authorities was before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. In the meantime the applicants were not without rights under art. 9 to manifest their pacifist beliefs by peaceful protests against war and against expenditure by central government on military purposes and by publicly declaring that the payment of their taxes in full without segregation was by compulsion, under protest and against their strongly held religious beliefs and consciences.

Court of Appeal (Civil Division). Judgment delivered 4 May 2006.